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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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POSSIBLE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT REGARDING POLAND

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Description

This paper discusses the need for an understanding among the USA, the UK, and the USSR with regard to Poland and proposes terms for such an understanding.

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POSSIBLE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT REGARDING POLAND

Summary and Conclusions

1. Although it is likely that the USSR will remain interested in preserving friendly relations with the US and the UK, and will refrain from extreme unilateral acts with regard to Poland likely to antagonize her Western allies, an early understanding among the Three Powers appears indispensable for a number of reasons.

2. Such an understanding should provide for a temporary demarcation line, following ethnographic lines as far as possible. The Polish Government in London after eliminating certain persons entirely unacceptable to the USSR and receiving additional personnel acceptable to the USSR, should be recognized by the USSR and conclude with it a civil affairs agreement along the lines of the Czechoslovak treaty. Temporary administrations east and west of the demarcation lines should be established. Provisions should be made for the evacuation of Poland by Russian forces and for democratic elections by Poland.

POSSIBLE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT REGARDING POLAND

Part I

1. Although Russian foreign policy after the war will be determined in a considerable degree by the balance of power resulting from this war, yet it may be anticipated that after the war Russia will not attempt to exploit her great power unduly, but will remain interested in preserving friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain and will refrain from extreme unilateral acts likely to antagonize her Western allies.

2. A bare possibility may therefore still exist of arriving at an early understanding with the U.S.S.R. concerning Poland but only if the attempt is made at once. Such an early understanding would be extremely desirable for the following reasons:

a. A hands-off policy towards Poland on the part of the United States and Great Britain is incompatible with the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter and the declarations issued in favor of Poland's independence.

b. Unless the Allies commit themselves to a policy of separate and exclusive spheres of influence, the fate of Poland must be the concern of the U.S.A. and of Great Britain as well as of Russia. The proposed alliance of Poland and Russia would not be a partnership, but essentially a provision for the control of the future foreign policy and military power of Poland by the Soviet Union. Such a merging of

Polish military force with that of Russia is not to the interest of the U. S. or Great Britain, nor is it necessary to the security of the strongest military power in Europe - the U.S.S.R.

c. A unilateral solution of the Polish problem by the U.S.S.R., even if moderate, would create a dubious precedent and would constitute a source of suspicion and friction among the Allies.

d. A unilateral solution by the U.S.S.R. would greatly aggravate the hostility towards Russia felt by the Polish groups in the U.S.A.

e. The Soviet Government is suspicious of the general intentions of the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Anglo-American support of the Polish Government-in-Exile only heightens this general suspicion and cannot possibly succeed in restoring either the London Government or the pre-war boundaries of Poland. The only road open to the Western Allies for securing the establishment in Poland of a government which would be, in some measure, free in its foreign and military policy, is through an early compromise with the U.S.S.R. (To undo a unilateral settlement once established in the presence of the Soviet armies will be out of the question.) At best, an attempt at compromise will help to improve the general relations among the three powers. At worst, it will leave their relations no more strained than at present, and the subsequent unilateral Soviet settlement in Poland will be no more adverse to Allied interests than it would be if no pre-settlement compromise were attempted.

f. An understanding reached after the U.S.S.R. has occupied Poland and sponsored a Polish government will amount simply to a grudg-

ing and profitless acceptance by the U. S. and Great Britain of a fait accompli brought about with the help of Russian military power. The completely pro-Russian orientation of the Polish government will be little affected by such Anglo-American action.

3. In view of these considerations, it would seem advisable that at an early date tripartite negotiations be opened to formulate a statement on common policy concerning Poland. Since the American offer to mediate the issue was declined by the U.S.S.R., such negotiations should avoid giving the impression that the United States is again attempting to mediate. The negotiations should rather follow the lines of the agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. The President of the United States could inform Marshal Stalin that the United States of America would publicly endorse a settlement of the Polish question if it roughly followed some such set of principles as those suggested in this paper.

4. An early understanding among the three Powers on the Polish question appears indispensable in view of the following considerations: The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. does not follow a rigid, dogmatic line. It is flexible and will adapt itself to a considerable extent to new situations. Such a new situation will arise in the event that a strong pro-Russian Communist movement emerges in Germany. If this movement is powerful, it is conceivable that the U.S.S.R. may come to terms with such a government at the expense of Polish interests. Such a solution would not only sacrifice Poland's national independence, but would at the same time incorporate Germany into the sphere of Russia's influence. This would give Russia an overwhelming power on the European continent,

would weaken Great Britain's position there, would endanger the security of the British Isles, and would thus create a situation wholly incompatible with American security. An agreement between the U.S.A., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., committing the latter to the restoration of Polish national independence with the participation of the U.S.A. and the U.K., would greatly diminish the possibility of future understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Germany at the expense of Poland.

5. Such an understanding may, however, have to be reached in conjunction with a simultaneous understanding of the three Powers with regard to Germany. The final Polish and the German settlements are interconnected, as the final Polish settlement can be reached only by the transfer of German territories to Poland in compensation for her Eastern provinces. If territories in addition to former German Upper Silesia must be transferred to Poland, two consequences must be envisaged: Poland and Germany will remain deadly enemies and Poland's security will be more dependent than ever upon the protection granted to Poland by the U. S. S. R. At the same time, the loss of large areas of unquestionably German territory by Germany may seriously impair the growth or the re-emergence of a democratic movement in Germany.

6. The Russian stake in the Polish problem is clearly much greater than that of either the U.S.A. or Great Britain. The most essential Russian interests are: (a) a frontier which would correspond roughly to the ethnographic demarcations and would increase Russian security; (b) the establishment in Poland of a government whose social basis and political orientation would be such as to ~~produce~~ generate a permanently friendly

and cooperative attitude towards Russia and, (c) the creation in Poland of economic and social conditions which would assure the stability of such a political system.

7. Two fundamental difficulties may stand in the way of such a solution. The first is the frontier problem. Should the Soviet Government resist all persuasionn to accept a temporary demarcation line, every effort should then be made to reach at once a final agreement among the Three Powers as to the Polish-Russian and Polish-German frontiers, and the agreement suggested below should be re-written accordingly. But the possibility of Anglo-American agreement to a final demarcation of frontiers should not be broached to the Soviet Government until every attempt has first been made to secure its acceptance of a temporary demarcation line.

The second fundamental difficulty is the manifest opposition of the present Polish Government-in-Exile to any solution entailing its political death. The political groups constituting the present government in London have too many interests at stake to agree to an agreement which, in order to function, must fundamentally change the structure of Poland. Being chauvinistic, nationalistic and intransigent toward basic political and social reforms, (which to them are always tantamount to Communism), the London Poles and the military leadership will fight to the bitter end any attempt to deprive them of their present positions. Since legal continuity of some kind is a part of the solution outlined below, a procedure by which this continuity may be preserved must be considered. Such a procedure would be the appointment of a new president-designate by the president, Mr. Raczkiewicz, followed by the resignation of Mr. Raczkiewicz, and the

appointment by the new president of a prime-minister willing and able to form a Government of liberal concentration. In view of the severe resistance to such a shift which may be expected from Raczkiewicz and his camp, only the strongest pressure on the part of the United States, Great Britain and Russia may succeed in forcing the indispensable realignment.

The possibility should not be neglected that popular, democratic elections after the termination of the Military Occupation may yield results unacceptable to the Russians. While the probability of such an outcome is very slim, steps must be taken to assure a good fighting chance for a progressive political movement in Poland. Such steps would consist mainly in public assurances and concrete measures on the part of all three powers proving that generous assistance in the work of reconstructing Poland will be forthcoming if Poland decides definitely to move in the direction of international cooperation and political realism, rather than obtusely to cling to megalomaniac notions of "power politics".

8. A viable settlement of the Polish questions must not only reconcile the interests of the three great Powers, but must be acceptable to Poland. It must thus provide for a guarantee of an independent Poland; at least a temporary demarcation line between Poland and Russia; a Civil Affairs agreement on Poland proper, following the principles laid down in the Russian-Czechoslovakian agreement; and an ultimate settlement which would safeguard democratic processes. The outlines of such an agreement are presented below.

Part II

I. Temporary Demarcation Line

The territory of pre-war Poland will be divided temporarily for the purpose of military administration. The division should follow ethnographic lines as far as possible, leaving territories populated by a Bielorussian and Ukrainian majority on the Russian side, and Polish-populated territories on the Polish side. The line would approximately follow the Curzon Line, perhaps with modifications in favor of the Poles. (It would be fortunate if Russia should agree to a line running east of the city of Lwow.

II. The Polish Government

The Polish Government in London

a. will eliminate certain persons unacceptable to the U.S.S.R.

b. will accept as members persons from among those active in the Underground in occupied Poland, and from Polish elements in the U.S.S.R. (the last to constitute not more than one-fourth of the government.)

c. will sign with the U.S.S.R. an agreement concerning the administration of Polish-populated territories (see IV, b).

III. The U.S.S.R.

The government of the Soviet Union

a. will recognize the reconstituted Polish government

b. will sign with that government an agreement for the administration of the territory west of the demarcation line (see IV, b).

IV. Temporary Administration

a. In the territories east of the demarcation line, military government will be organized by the U.S.S.R.

b. To the west between the demarcation line and the Polish-German frontier of 1939, the administration will be in the hands of the Polish Government, except that in the parts of this territory which are in the zone of operations of the Russian armies, the administration will be set up in accordance with an agreement similar to the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of 30 April 1944.

V. Final Settlement

a. Within one year after the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the Russian military forces shall withdraw from the territory between the Polish-Russian line of demarcation and the Polish-German frontier of 1939, except that Russian transport troops may continue for an agreed period to operate certain specified railways that constitute indispensable lines of Russian communication, as long as a Russian army of occupation remains in Germany.

b. Democratic elections shall be held in the territories indicated in V "a" above, within six months after the Russian evacuation.

c. The Polish government constituted on the basis of these elections shall negotiate with the U.S.S.R. a final settlement of the Eastern boundary. Poland will be compensated at the expense of Germany, if the Polish government so desires.

d. If under the terms of V "c" above, any territory outside the limits described in V "a" above is included in the Polish state, such territory shall be evacuated by the Russian military forces within six

months after the ratification of the treaty or treaties affecting the territory concerned. (Exception: Transport troops, as provided in V "a" above.)